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The legacy of Newton for the pre-Critical Kant 
 
Michela Massimi 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Newton’s far-reaching influence for Kant’s philosophy of nature is well documented, and 
has rightly been at the center of an important literature. No one more than Kant was 
responsible for placing Newton’s natural philosophy center-stage in the philosophical 
milieu of the eighteenth century. Yet no one more than Kant had a complex and nuanced 
approach to some key aspects of Newtonian science. While much ink has been spilled 
over Kant’s allegiance to Newton in the Critical period,1 Kant’s early acquaintance with 
Newtonianism has not received a similar degree of attention.2 Yet the pre-Critical period 
is key to understanding the formation and evolution of some seminal ideas of Kant. The 
pre-Critical period can also reveal the idiosyncratic blend of intellectual traditions and 
scientific sources, which is so distinctive of the early Kant. The goal of this chapter is to 
offer a very brief survey of Newton’s legacy for the pre-Critical Kant (i.e. before the 
Inaugural Dissertation of 1770).  
Over the past three decades, important work has been done to clarify how Kant’s 
view of geometry and mathematics3 was inspired by Newton, as much as his mature view 
on Dynamics and Mechanics seems to have been shaped upon Newtonian mechanics. 
This trend in Kantian studies mirrors a similar one in Newton studies, where scholars 
have paid increasing attention to the broader philosophical project surrounding 
Newtonian science.4 Was Kant an unfailing supporter of Newton all along? Should we 
read Kant’s philosophy of nature as providing a systematic philosophical framework for 
Newtonian science? 
While it cannot be gainsaid that Newton played a key role in influencing the young 
Kant and his (early and mature) reflections on nature, the answers to the two questions 
above are not as platitudinous as they may seem. For Kant’s philosophy of nature 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Friedman (1992a) and (2013); Plaass (1965); Pollok (2001); Smith (2013b); 
Tuschling (1971); Warren (2010); and Watkins (1998a), (1998b), (2001) just to mention a 
few examples. 
2 For some relevant exceptions, see Adickes (1924); Grillenzoni (1998); Polonoff (1973); 
Schönfeld (2000); Tonelli (1959); Watkins (2005). 
3 See for example DiSalle (2006); and Domski (2013). 
4 See Janiak (2008); Janiak and Schliesser (2012); Brading (2012); and Schliesser (2011), 
among others. 
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evolved and developed over time, from his very early contributions in the 1750s, to his 
mature Critical period. Any accurate answer to the question as to whether Kant was an 
unfailing supporter of Newton would require a systematic investigation of particular 
phases within Kant’s vast intellectual production, and a detailed analysis of the historical 
context behind it.  
The presence of distinctive Newtonian elements in Kant’s writings on natural 
science oscillates significantly even within a single phase of his productive career. Just to 
confine our attention to the pre-Critical writings, Newton and Newtonian themes were 
absent in Kant’s first work Thoughts on the true estimation of living forces (1748). They appear 
in what some scholars have portrayed as Kant’s ‘conversion to Newton’ in Universal 
Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755), whose subtitle reads “An essay on the 
constitution and mechanical origin of the whole universe treated according to Newton’s 
principles”. Yet Newtonian themes seem again marginal in Kant’s defense of 
relationalism about space in New doctrine of motion and rest (1758), which in turn seems in 
stark contrast with Kant’s seeming advocacy of absolute space in Directions in Space 
(1768).  
Kant’s attitude towards Newton’s mechanics and natural philosophy should be 
read against the backdrop of the scientific panorama of the time, in particular the 
scientific sources available to Kant (first-hand or second-hand) via the Leipzig–based 
Acta Eruditorum, or the proceedings of the Berlin Royal Academy of Sciences. We can only 
reconstruct these sources from explicit references in Kant’s early writings. At a glance, 
these sources reveal that the young Kant was mostly (but not exclusively) acquainted 
with Newton second-hand. Namely, the Newton, who had either been targeted in 
Leibnizian–Wolffian quarters, or celebrated by British natural philosophers and 
Newtonian supporters in the Continent (especially, in France and in the Netherlands). 
This is possibly a different Newton from the one we are so accustomed to. Thus, 
reconstructing Newton’s legacy for the early Kant’s philosophy of nature can be a 
daunting exercise at the key junction of Kantian studies, intellectual and social history of 
science, as well as history of philosophy.  
Important work has been done to assess the nuanced legacy of Newton for Kant’s 
philosophy of nature, in particular for Kant’s view on the laws of nature. Buchdahl5 
famously argued for the so-called ‘looseness of fit’ between Kant’s transcendental 
apparatus and the foundations of physical science against the standard view, which for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Buchdahl (1974). 
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long time had maintained a strict link between the two. For example, the role of the 
category of quality in providing a priori justification for Kant’s Dynamics in MAN was 
challenged.6 The empirical laws of Newtonian mechanics were regarded as established 
not top-down (from the Principles of the Transcendental Analytic) but bottom-up, from 
the special metaphysics of nature, and in particular from the empirical concept of matter. 
Since the early 1990s, against both the standard view and Buchdahl’s ‘looseness of fit’ 
interpretation, Friedman has argued that Kant’s transcendental project should be read as 
providing the philosophical groundwork for Newton’s physics.7 What is at stake in 
Friedman’s interpretation is neither the contentious view that the lawfulness of nature 
under the transcendental laws of the understanding (e.g., causality, for example) per se 
guarantees or licenses empirical laws of nature. Nor that empirical laws are known a 
priori, like their transcendental counterparts. Instead, on Friedman’s view, something like 
the a priori principle of causality has to be in place for us to recognize a sequence of 
events or uniformities in nature as lawlike (pace Hume), even if particular laws of nature 
can only be empirically discovered.  
While the debate surrounding the standard view, the looseness of fit and 
Friedman’s own interpretation addresses the overarching issue of how Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy relates to his philosophy of nature, a myriad of questions can 
be raised about specific aspects of Kant’s philosophy of nature and its debt to Newton. 
For example, are Kant’s laws of mechanics in MAN somehow patterned upon Newton’s 
laws of motion? The answer is far from obvious. For example, Watkins has argued for a 
reappraisal of Leibniznian influences instead.8 Stan has in turn documented how Kant’s 
third law of mechanics had its origins in Leibniz’s Reaction Principle, and its later 
incarnations in the work of Jacob Hermann and Christian Wolff (as opposed to 
Newton’s third law).9 Pre-Newtonian aspects of Kant’s conception of force (back to True 
estimation of living forces) have been brought to the fore to understand Kant’s famous 
balancing argument for attraction and repulsion in the Chapter on Dynamics in MAN.10 
Anti-Newtonian aspects have also been found in Kant’s Universal Natural History, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For further details on this point and a critical discussion of the standard view, see 
Watkins (1998B). 
7 Friedman (1992a), (1992b), (2013). 
8 Watkins (1998a) rightly notes that Newton’s second law is absent among Kant’s laws, 
and even Kant’s formulation of the law of inertia is effectively different from Newton. 
9 Stan (2013). 
10 Warren (2010). Contra Warren, Smith (2013a) has defended a Newtonian reading of 
the balancing argument. 
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whereby the order and lawfulness of nature is not ascribed directly to God’s hand but to 
matter and its necessary laws.11  Similar anti-Newtonian sentiments, this time along 
Spinoza’s lines, have been recounted in Universal Natural History.12 And Cartesian echoes 
present in Kant’s first essay on True estimation of living forces have also received recent 
attention.13 As these few examples show, Newton’s legacy for Kant is a very nuanced 
territory to chart.  
Given the complexity of the historical background and the variety of themes in 
Kant’s philosophy of nature, in what follows I make a very selective choice. I concentrate 
exclusively on the early Kant around 1748–1768. And even within this twenty-year span, 
I selectively pay attention to only a handful of Kant’s writings and one specific (but 
hopefully revealing) aspect of Newton’s legacy for Kant: the evolution of Kant’s view of 
space. The received view has it that in the pre-Critical period Kant shifted from an 
originally Leibnizian / relationalist view of space (still evident in Physical Monadology and 
New doctrine of motion and rest, 1758) to a proper Newtonian view of absolute space via the 
incongruent counterparts argument of Directions in Space (1768), for then abandoning 
absolute space in the Inaugural Dissertation (1770).14 Indeed, Kant famously criticized 
Newton’s absolute space (as well as Leibniz’s relationalism) in the Critique of Pure Reason15 
in the name of transcendental idealism. And the same argument from incongruent 
counterparts was later employed in the Prolegomena as an argument for space as “the form 
of outer intuition of […] sensibility”.16 In what follows, I take some preliminary steps 
towards challenging this received view of the evolution of Kant’s view of space in the 
period 1748–1768. 
 I have two main goals in mind: the first historical, and the second philosophical. 
First, I want to draw attention to the role that Newton’s matter theory and chemistry 
played for the young Kant. Without denying the importance of the Principia for Kant, 
there is yet another Newton—a more experimental Newton, who speculated about the 
ether and chemical reactions in the Queries of the Opticks—that in my view has not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Watkins (2013). 
12 Schliesser (2013). 
13 Massimi and De Bianchi (2013).  
14 To be precise, absolute space did not disappear entirely in the Critical period. Indeed, it 
reappears for example in the General Remark to Phenomenology in MAN as a necessary 
concept of reason. 
15 Kant (1781/1787/1997): A23/B37. As it is custom, the A refers to the first (1781) 
edition and the B to the second (1787) edition. 
16 AA 4:286. Kant (1783/2004 2nd ed.). 
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received the full attention he deserves by Kant scholars17 (despite being well-known 
among historians of science). In my view, the speculative Newtonian experimentalism of 
the first half of the eighteenth century can cast interesting new light on the possible 
legacy of Newton on Kant, and can help reassess some vexed issues.  
I have argued elsewhere, for example, that some puzzling aspects of Kant’s view of 
repulsive force (still evident in MAN) can be explained against the backdrop of 
Newtonian experimentalism. For Kant’s claim that repulsive force comes in degrees in 
different matters such as air, ether, and heat, among which the same attractive force is 
active, can be easily explained if we take repulsion as an original elastic force (whose 
physical seat or repository consisted in some material carrier—be it air or ether—
following Newton’s pre-Principia matter theory, and Newtonians such as Stephen Hales 
and Herman Boerhaave).18 Similarly, Kant’s puzzling claim in the Third Chapter of 
MAN that all mechanical laws presuppose dynamical laws, and matter cannot have 
moving force except by means of attraction and repulsion19 can receive new light if 
understood against the background of Kant’s early engagement with the vis viva debate; 
and, in particular, his defense of the Cartesian Dortous de Mairan against the Leibnizian 
Du Châtelet in the 1740 controversy. In what follows, I draw attention to yet another 
role for Newton’s matter theory in shaping another key aspect of Kant’s philosophy of 
natural science: space. 
Thus, my second (more philosophical) goal is to urge a note of caution against the 
received view that has portrayed Kant as sitting squarely within the Newtonian tradition 
from the very beginning. If by “Newtonian tradition”, we mean the Newtonian 
mechanics of the Principia and the ensuing tradition in mechanics that developed out of 
it, there seems to be evidence to suggest a more nuanced reappraisal of this claim. The 
case of absolute space is illuminating. Did the young Kant convert to Newton’s 
absolutism (ca. 1768), short-lived as the conversion proved to be? In what follows, I take 
some steps towards answering this question in a negative way. I show that in the relevant 
period around 1748–1768, Kant was working with a thoroughgoing relational view of 
space, naturally ensuing from Kant’s matter theory of around 1755. While sufficiently 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 A notable exception is Carrier (2001), for example. See also McNulty (2014). 
18 I have offered my interpretive analysis of these Newtonian origins of Kant’s repulsive 
force in Universal Natural History in Massimi (2011), and I refer the interested reader to 
that paper for further details on this topic. 
19 AA 4: 537. Kant (1786/2004). For the influence of this earlier debate on vis viva on 
Kant’s True estimation and its lingering echoes in the aforementioned passage of MAN, 
see Massimi and De Bianchi (2013). 
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distant from both Leibniz’s and Wolff’s relationalism, Kant’s view of space was 
elaborated primarily against the backdrop of the Leibnizian–Wolffian tradition20 and of 
Kant’s new dynamical theory of matter, which was, in turn, inspired by speculative 
Newtonian experimentalism.  
In Section 2, I offer a brief overview of the historical context to assess Newton’s 
legacy on the young Kant, by paying attention to the role of the Opticks in the first half of 
the eighteenth century and to Continental Newtonianism. In Section 3, I turn to the 
philosophical question as to whether the pre-Critical Kant around 1748–1768 did in fact 
endorse Newton’s absolute space, before turning to transcendental idealism. I make 
some remarks, which—tentative as they might be—suggest, nonetheless, a more cautious 
answer to the question.    
 
2. The pre-Critical Kant and its Newtonian mil ieu   
Before making my case for a nuanced picture of Newton’s impact on the pre-Critical 
Kant, it may be worth recalling briefly the intellectual context in which the young Kant 
was educated and trained,21 and draw attention to the wider Newtonian context of the 
first half of the eighteenth century. As Isaac Bernhard Cohen originally pointed out,22 
two very different Newtonian traditions were present at the time: the experimental 
Newtonianism, typical of the Opticks (first English edition 1704; first Latin edition 1706, 
and second English edition 1717); and the mathematical Newtonianism, more evident in 
the Principia (first edition 1687, second edition 1713, third edition 1726).23 In the first 
Latin edition and the second English edition of the Opticks, Newton introduced two sets 
of Queries, where he relegated the most general, often highly speculative, principles that 
could be inductively drawn from observations and experiments. Among them, the ether 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  For an excellent reconstruction of how Kant’s matter theory of this period, especially 
evident in Physical Monadology, borrows from and, at the same time, distances itself from 
Leibniz, Wolff, and also Baumgarten, see Watkins (2006). 
21 See Pozzo and Oberhausen (2002) and Kuehn (2001). 
22 Cohen (1956). For a more recent, and somehow antithetic trend about Newton’s 
legacy in the Continent (especially in relation to chemistry), see Principe (2007) 
23 Of course, this broad methodological distinction between the Opticks and the Principia 
does not capture important nuances, i.e. experimental aspects present in the Principia, for 
example, and mathematical stages present in the Opticks (I thank Chris Smeenk for 
raising this point). More recently, Ahnert (forthcoming) has made a similar point about 
the separation of Newton’s mathematics from Newton’s natural philosophy and why the 
latter spread more successfully in the German-speaking countries. Not only was 
Newton’s mathematics too complex to be taught in Philosophy Faculties; Newton’s 
mathematics was also regarded as lacking a proper metaphysical foundation. 
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featured prominently as a medium for the explanation of gravity, optical, thermal, and 
even electrical phenomena.  
In the first edition of the Principia Newton argued against the ether and provided a 
mathematical treatment for the behavior of elastic fluids, which did not require any 
subtle matter.24 But the hypothesis of the ether returned prominently in the Queries of 
the Opticks, after a premature appearance in Newton’s pre-Principia matter theory.25 The 
existence of a very subtle ether was introduced to explain how light was refracted and 
reflected, as well as the transmission of heat among bodies (Query 18), and a possible 
gravitational mechanism for planetary motion (Query 21).26 In addition to the ether, 
speculations about chemical phenomena, metal combustions (with the ensuing release of 
‘true permanent air’,) and fermentations of various substances too featured in the 
Queries of the Opticks. In Query 31, for example, Newton famously introduced the two 
active principles of attraction and repulsion, as the “cause of Gravity” and the “cause of 
Fermentation”, respectively,27 through which matter in the universe was said to be 
continuously preserved from decaying. Repulsive force was associated with chemical 
phenomena of fermentations, through which air (qua physical seat of repulsive force, 
trapped in the pores of various substances) would be released.  
 A time-honored historiographical tradition has long emphasized the role that the 
Newtonian experimentalism of the Opticks—with its speculations on fermentations, 
chemical reactions with Aqua fortis, and the ether—exercised on the natural philosophy 
of the first half of the eighteenth-century.28 According to this historiographical tradition, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See Book II, Proposition XXIII, Theorem XVIII of the Principia for example. 
25 See Newton’s famous letter to Boyle (28 February 1678-9) published in Boyle (1744), 
and the pre-Principia text De Aere et Aethere (written probably around 1674). Newton’s 
speculations on the ether took the lead from Boyle’s experimental tradition (especially, 
Boyle’s experiments on calcination of metals). In De Aere et Aethere, Newton claimed that 
air was composed of particles repelling each other with a certain force. In the letter to 
Boyle, repulsive force was re-assigned from the air to the ether, and the rarefaction of the 
ether was taken to be responsible for the endeavor of bodies to recede.     
26 Similar attempts to use the ether as a gravitational mechanism can be found in 
Descartes’s vortex theory, Leibniz’s continuum elastic ether (in the Tentamen written in 
response to Newton’s first edition of the Principia), as well as in Euler. For a survey of 
ether theories at the time, see Aiton (1972).  
27 Newton (1704/1717/1752), Query 31, p. 395 
28 This historiographical trend began with the work of Metzger (1930), and Guerlac 
(1950) and Cohen (1956). For a recent dissenting voice, see Principe (2007). It is beyond 
my expertise and my aim here to enter into this historiographical debate. My concern 
here is not so much about which chemical school proved more influential in the 
Continent in the first half of the eighteenth century, but rather which Newtonian aspects 
can be found in the pre-Critical Kant’s reflections on natural philosophy.  
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more than Newton’s mechanics in the Principia (whose mathematical language and 
technical results demanded a level of knowledge not easily available at the time), it was 
Newton’s chemistry and matter theory in the Opticks that had a far-reaching influence for 
natural philosophy both in Britain and in the Continent at the time. 
In Britain, the Opticks influenced the work of an entire generation of iatro-
chemists, including the brothers John and James Keill, 29  while the publication of 
Newton’s letter to Boyle on the ether (28 February 1678) in Thomas Birch’s edition of 
Boyle’s works played a key role in establishing Newton’s speculations on the ether as 
Newton’s orthodox matter theory. Another key textbook that marked the triumph of the 
speculative Newtonian experimentalism of the Opticks was Stephen Hales’ Vegetable 
Staticks (1727). Hales latched onto Newton’s discussion of attraction and repulsion, and 
picked up on Newton’s pre-Principia identification of the air as the physical seat of 
repulsive force. He defended what he called “elastick air”, trapped in the pores of 
mineral, vegetable and animal substances, and released upon fermentation or 
combustion. Vegetable Staticks won acclaim in British Newtonian quarters and beyond. 
Desaguliers wrote a very positive review in the Philosophical Transactions,30 where he 
presented it as the best confirmation for Newton’s Queries. The book was translated first 
into French, and then into German with a Preface by Christian Wolff in 1748, and had a 
far-reaching influence on the Continent, especially on the Dutch Newtonianism that 
flourished in Leiden under Herman Boerhaave.  
Newtonianism spread in the Continent in the early eighteenth century not without 
some resistance from Cartesian and Leibnizian quarters. France proved a hostile 
environment for experimental Newtonianism, with Edme Mariotte’s firm resistance 
against Newton’s theory of colours.31 By contrast, Holland provided a fertile territory for 
experimental Newtonianism, after the advent of Wilhelm of Orange in 1688, and the 
ensuing strengthened cultural links with England. The Dutch natural philosopher ‘s 
Gravesande, for example, came to England as ambassador to the first Hannoverian King 
George I, and was elected Fellow of the Royal Society. Upon his return to Leiden, ‘s 
Gravesande obtained the Chair of Astronomy and Mathematics, and his 1720 textbook 
Physices elementa mathematica was soon translated into English by Desaguliers. Like Hales 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  John Keill’s Introductio ad veram physicam (1702) was originally written as a set of lectures, 
and became soon one of the standard textbooks on natural philosophy, with six Latin 
editions, an English translation in 1720, and six further English editions (See Schofield, 
1970, p. 27). 
30 See Schofield (1970), p. 81.  
31 See Guerlac (1981), p. 100ff.  
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after him, ‘s Gravesande went back to the pre-Principia Newtonian theme of the air as the 
physical seat of repulsion, while fire was considered to be a subtle material substance 
contained in all bodies. The idea of fire as a subtle, fluid substance was also defended by 
Pieter von Musschenbroek, the discover of the Leyden jar, and Chair of Mathematics 
and Philosophy at Utrecht from 1723, and then in Leiden in 1740. Musschenbroek’s 
main text Elementa Physicae (1741) became the standard textbook of experimental natural 
philosophy, and was soon translated into English in 1744, and into German in 1747.  
But, undoubtedly, the key figure in the thriving community of Dutch Newtonians32  
was Herman Boerhaave, Professor of Chemistry in Leiden (from 1718 until his death in 
1738). Building on Hales’ Vegatable Staticks, in Elementa Chemiae (1732), Boerhaave 
defended the view that fire was a very subtle material fluid—similar to Newton’s ether—
present in all bodies and responsible for their states of physical aggregation.33 Moreover, 
just like Hales’ “elastick air”, Boerhaave’s material fire too was an elastic matter fixed in 
the pores of all substances and able to rarefy them in virtue of its repulsive power acting 
by direct contact.34  
I have argued elsewhere35 that the elaboration of Kant’s dynamical theory of matter 
around 1755—as evident in Universal Natural History and On Fire—owes a great debt to 
this British–Dutch experimentalist tradition. A central aspect of Kant’s pre-Critical 
dynamics (somehow retained also in the Critical period with provisos) is the treatment of 
repulsive force as a contact force acting as an elastic fluid surrounding matter’s parts. In 
the next Section, I argue that this same Newtonian experimentalist tradition influenced 
also Kant’s view of space in the pre-Critical period around 1748–1768. The received view 
maintains the following three theses: 
(i.)    the pre-Critical Kant embraced Newtonianism since the very beginning of 
his career (back to True estimation in 1748); 
(i.) Kant temporarily endorsed a form of relationalism about space in 
Physical Monadology (1756); 
(ii.) But in Directions in space (1768), Kant turned his back to relationalism to 
defend instead Newton’s absolute space via the argument from 
incongruent counterparts. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 On the Leiden Newtonian school surrounding Boerhaave, see Ruestow (1973). 
33 Boerhaave (1732 /1735), vol. I, pp. 104-113. 
34 Metzger (1930), p. 56, identified Boerhaave as the main source behind Boscovich’s 
dynamical theory of matter, whereby attraction is understood in terms of gravitation and 
repulsion in terms of imponderable fluids such as caloric.   
35 See Massimi (2011). 
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In what follows, I suggest that the way Kant came to elaborate his view of space from 
True estimation to Directions in space betrays once more his idiosyncratic blend of the 
Wolffian and the Newtonian traditions. In particular, it reveals the far-reaching influence 
of Newton’s matter theory and chemistry on a still broadly Wolffian-relationalist 
framework. I argue for the following three points: 
 
(i.a) Pace (i.), Kant’s view of space in True estimation borrows from Wolffian 
metaphysics of monadic substances and their mutual actions.  
 
(ii.a) The relationalism advocated in Physical Monadology is at some distance from 
both Leibniz and Wolff, and betrays Kant’s debt to speculative Newtonianism in 
the treatment of physical monads as spheres of activity (with repulsion again 
understood as a contact force and exemplified by the “ether, that is to say, the 
matter of fire”),36 notwithstanding thesis (ii.)  
 
(iii.a) Finally, Kant’s enthusiasm for Newton’s programme in Directions in space 
requires a few caveats, and, in my view, should be read instead as containing the 
seminal seeds of Kant’s later Critical treatment of space.  
 
In the next Section, I go on to substantiate points (i.a)–(iii.a). 
 
3. The pre-Critical Kant on space.  
Beyond Wolffian relationalism and Newtonian absolutism 
 
One topic where the young Kant’s debt to Newton’s natural philosophy emerges vividly 
is the nature of space. In the General Scholium added to the second edition of the 
Principia (1713), Newton famously defended absolute space as the expression of God’s 
omnipresence in the world. In 1720, the Leibniz–Clarke correspondence appeared in a 
German translation with a Preface by Christian Wolff, making the debate available to the 
German-speaking community. Twenty-six years later, in 1746, Euler published a 
trenchant critique of Leibniz’s monadology entitled Thoughts on the Elements of Corporeal 
Entities, and monadology was again the topic of the 1747 Berlin Academy prize essay 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 AA I: 487. Kant (1756/1992). 
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competition.37 At stake in the debate between friends and foes of monadology was the 
vexed question as to whether matter consisted of simple, non-extended elements, or 
indivisible monads, endowed with primitive inherent forces (what Leibniz called vis 
activa). Leibnizian dynamics38  aimed to explain physical phenomena, such as elastic 
collisions between bodies, in terms of derivative forces, somehow correlated to the primitive 
forces of the non-extended simple monads. The post-Leibnizian tradition, with Wolff 
first and Baumgarten then, elaborated Leibniz’s monadology along new important lines.39 
In Philosophia prima; sive Ontologia Wolff reflected on the role of monads (qua simple 
elements) in the analysis of the  compositionality of bodies and their spatial divisibility. In 
Metaphysica Baumgarten, in turn, was the first to regard monads as ‘physical’ and 
endowed with impenetrability. Although Baumgarten’s ‘physical monads’ represented an 
important departure from Leibniz’s (and Wolff’s) monads, Baumgarten was still trapped 
into a fully Leibnizian mode in thinking that the interactions between physical monads 
were explained by pre-established harmony. Baumgarten’s impenetrable ‘physical 
monads’ lack genuine physical modes of interactions. 
It is in this intellectual climate that the young Kant wrote his very first essay on the 
True estimation of living forces.40 Kant’s goal was to investigate the cause of motion within a 
broadly Leibnizian–Wolffian framework. Following a well-trodden path that Wolff had 
originally opened by reinterpreting Leibnizian monads as amenable to interactions 
among each other, Kant introduced the idea that substances must exercise their forces in 
space and time, with time defined as “the succession of things”, and space as the 
“coexistent states of the world”.41 Substances have active forces and cannot remain 
inactive. As such they exercise their forces by acting on one another and changing the 
internal states of other substances. The exercise of forces occurs in space and time. 
While the language of things coexisting in space and succeeding one another in time 
might sound reminiscent of Newton’s absolute space and time as the ultimate containers 
of everything that exists, nothing could in fact be more remote from it.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See Ahnert (forthcoming). 
38 See Leibniz (1695 /1969). 39	  For an excellent analysis of this debate on the nature of monads from Leibniz, to 
Wolff, Baumgarten and the pre-Critical Kant, please see Watkins (2006). 
40 Kant (1747 / 2012). 
41 AA 1: 19. Kant (1747/2012), pp. 23, 24. The relationalist view of space qua 
“coexistence” of substances can be found in Wolff’s Philosophia prima, sive Ontologia. For a 
discussion of Wolff and Newton, see Stan (2012), p. 463. 
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For, as Kant points out later in the text, “it is easy to show that there would be no 
space and no extension if substances had no force to act external to themselves. For 
without this force, there is no connection, without connection, no order, and finally, 
without order, no space. Yet it is somewhat more difficult to see how the plurality of 
dimensions in space derives from the law according to which this force of substances 
acts externally”.42 Kant’s working hypothesis was not Newton’s absolute space as a 
privileged reference frame for bodies in motion, but instead the Wolffian nexus rerum.  
Thus, pace claim (i.) it is not the case that Kant embraced Newtonianism from the very 
beginning. He was instead working with a thoroughly Wolffian metaphysics of monadic 
substances and their mutual actions. The challenge for the young Kant consisted in 
explaining how the three-dimensionality of space could follow from this still broadly 
Wolffian metaphysical dynamics. More precisely, the main challenge facing Kant was to 
spell out the mechanism through which substances endowed with active forces could 
exercise their powers in space and time, qua physical space and time. And the challenge 
could only be met by following Baumgarten’s intuition and developing it further: i.e by 
making substances (and their interactions) physical. 
Kant addressed this challenge a few years later in Physical Monadology. In this 1756 
text, Kant went back to the idea of reciprocally acting substances, this time described as 
physical monads. Kant’s ambitious task was to reconcile the infinite divisibility of space 
with the view of metaphysically simple, non-divisible elements of bodies. For the infinite 
divisibility of space, Kant took his cue from the Newtonian John Keill, who in the 1720 
English edition of An Introduction to Natural Philosophy had famously challenged those 
philosophers, who while readily allowing mathematical bodies to be infinitely divisible, 
denied nonetheless the infinite divisibility of physical bodies.43 Keill’s proof for the 
infinite divisibility of bodies proceeded by assuming that given two parallel lines and 
given two points A and B lying on these parallel lines along the vertical A–B, it was 
possible to divide the vertical line A–B by drawing an infinite number of lines, all 
originating from one point C (located on the left hand side of point A on the top line), to 
an infinity of points E–F–G–…(located on the right hand side of point B on the bottom 
line).  
In Physical Monadology Kant went back Keill’s proof. Yet he reached the 
diametrically opposite conclusion that the infinite divisibility of space was in fact 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 AA 1: 23. Kant (1747/2012), pp. 26-27. 
43 Keill (1726, 2nd ed.), pp. 30-31. 
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consistent with the assumption that bodies consisted of a determinate number of simple 
parts (Corollary. Proposition IV. Theorem).44 Kant motivated his stark conclusion on the 
ground that “space, which is entirely free from substantiality and which is the appearance of 
the external relations of unitary monads, will not at all be exhausted by division continued to 
infinity”.45 While bodies are compounded of many simple elements (physical monads) 
that cannot be divided infinitely (on pain of contradicting the very principle of 
composition), the space taken up by bodies is itself infinitely divisible. The infinite 
divisibility of the geometrical space did not align with the finite divisibility of material 
compounds, because—Kant argued—space was not itself a substance or a physical entity 
amenable to composition. Parts of space lacked existence of their own.  
By denying substantiality to space, Kant could endorse without contradiction both 
Keill’s proof of the infinite divisibility of space and an improved Wolffian–Baumgartian 
version of monadology. Newtonians erred in waving Keill’s proof against the 
“metaphysicians”, as much as the “metaphysicians” erred in maintaining against the 
“geometers” that the properties of space were imaginary. Key to this rapprochement was 
Kant’s view of space as “a certain appearance of the external relations of substances”, 
whereby plurality and division would not jeopardize the unity of the substances itself. 
But how should we understand Kant’s view of space as an appearance of external 
relations among substances? How do substances mutually interact, and how does space 
result from their interactions? Kant’s answer to these questions was in terms of ‘sphere 
of activity’—physical monads fill space not through the composition of their substantial 
parts, but instead via their spheres of activity.  
The previous notion of space as ensuing from the reciprocal actions of 
substances46 finds its ultimate expression in a dynamical scenario of physical monads as 
point-like entities surrounded by spheres of activities, through which space is filled. 
Following Baumgarten, Kant called the force through which physical monads fill the 
space “impenetrability”, as a fundamental repulsive force acting by direct contact among 
elements of any body. In Kant’s picture, space was constituted by the action and reaction 
of simple elements of bodies or physical monads. Their respective spheres of activity 
were in direct contact via repelling forces responsible for filling the space by making 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 AA 1: 478–480. Kant (1756/1992). 
45 AA 1: 479. Kant (1756/1992). 46	  See on this point also New Elucidation, where Kant spelled out his view of space as 
being constituted by the “interconnected actions of substances, reaction always being of 
necessity conjoined with such interconnected actions” AA1: 415. Kant (1755b/1992). 
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physical monads recede from each other, while attractive forces among their centers of 
mass would counterbalance their endeavor to recede.47 Repulsive force explained how 
bodies resisted penetration by other bodies, while attraction secured the cohesion among 
bodies’ simple elements, anticipating the famous balancing argument of MAN.  
The dynamical balance of original forces of attraction and repulsion—via direct 
contact among the spheres of activity of simple elements—ultimately secured space as an 
appearance of external relations among substances. Thus, it would seem that Kant’s view 
of space emerging from Physical Monadology is a form of relationalism in continuity with 
Leibniz, Wolff and Baumgarten in taking spatial properties as relational (as opposed to 
intrinsic) properties of substances. Under this reading, the infinite divisibility of space 
would not jeopardise the unity and simplicity of the monads because the divisibility of 
space  would be confined to the divisibility of external relations among substances, and 
not their internal determinations, or intrinsic properties, which are not in space. Yet, 
there is a problem with this otherwise tempting relationalist reading of Kant’s view of 
space; a problem, whose solution will reveal the importance, in my view, of Newtonian 
experimentalism for Kant’s view of space. The problem is the following.  
Suppose we take ‘external determinations of substances’ to be defined by the 
boundaries of the spheres of activity of metaphysical monads: i.e., the external relation 
between physical monad A and physical monad B is defined by the surface area (which 
may well reduce to one single point) where the sphere of activity of substance A touches 
or is in contact with the sphere of activity of the adjacent substance B. In other words, 
space is defined by the relation through which substance A (with its sphere of activity 
consisting of attractive and repulsive forces), respectively attracts and at the same time 
resists penetration from an adjacent substance B. 
Given this picture, saying that the divisibility of space is restricted to the divisibility 
of substances’ external relations implies that spatial divisibility cuts physical monads ‘at 
their joints’, so to speak, i.e. along the tangents to the points of contact among their 
respective spheres of activity. But how is this possible? This kind of spatial divisibility 
would be finite and discrete (cutting physical monads’ joints) and at quite a distance form 
Keill’s infinite geometrical divisibility that Kant has just defended. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 AA 1: 484. Kant (1756/1992). In Universal Natural History, just a year earlier, Kant had 
developed a dynamical cosmogony based on primitive attractive and repulsive forces 
applied to ‘fine matter’, which he thought must have filled the space at the origin of the 
cosmos. For a penetrating analysis of the way repulsive and attractive forces are balanced 
in Kant’s physical monads and for its divergence from Boschovich, see Smith (2013b). 
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Here is then the problem: how can physical monads fill space via their spheres of 
activity, and space being infinitely divisible without: 
(a) either jeopardizing the simplicity and unity of the monads (pace monadology) 
(b) or reaching the contradictory conclusion that the divisibility of space (qua 
external relations among substances) can only be finite and discrete (i.e. along 
the boundaries of physical monads and their contact points, pace Keill’s proof 
of the infinite divisibility of space). 
In my view, this conundrum can be solved by bringing in considerations from 
Newtonian experimentalism; in particular, by considering Kant’s sui generis treatment of 
repulsive force as a contact force through which physical monads fill space by resisting 
penetration from each other. I said sui generis treatment because in Proposition XI. 
Theorem, against the standard Newtonian view of specific density of bodies as the ratio 
between mass and volume, whereby bodies with the same volume may nonetheless 
possess different specific densities because of the different amount of interstitial vacua, 
Kant offered an alternative view. On Kant’s view, bodies of different kinds (e.g. “ether, 
air, water, and gold”) had different densities simply because they possessed different 
inherent inertia (or inertial mass) of their elements.48 Specific densities were not explained 
by a greater or smaller vacuum interposed among the pores of different kinds of 
substances. For even the interstices of denser bodies, which are narrower, could be 
penetrated by less dense bodies such as “fire, and the magnetic and electric fluid”, Kant 
argued. Instead, specific densities were due to a perfectly elastic force “which is different 
in different things”, and which constituted “a medium which is, in itself and without the 
admixture of a vacuum, primitively elastic” (Proposition XIII. Theorem). As a primary 
example of elastic bodies, Kant mentioned the ether, “that is to say, the matter of fire”, 
with an unequivocal homage to Boerhaave’s material fire, in continuity with another of 
Kant’s writings of this time, On Fire, where the ether was presented as both the matter of 
fire and the matter of light.49 
Thus, we see here exemplified an interesting way in which the view of space 
expounded in Physical Monadology borrows elements from the Newtonian experimentalist  
tradition. To avoid the aforementioned conundrum of either jeopardizing the simplicity 
and unity of the monads, or making the divisibility of space finite and discrete, Kant 
originally availed himself of a distinctively Newtonian experimentalist view of repulsive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 AA 1: 485- 486. Kant (1756/1992). 
49 For an analysis of On Fire see Massimi (2011). 
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force qua a perfectly elastic force, coming in different degrees in different kinds of 
materials (e.g., ether, air, water, gold). By understanding the impenetrability of bodies, 
and hence the boundaries of the spheres of activity of physical monads, as defined by the 
action of a perfectly elastic repulsive force, Kant could eschew the conundrum: 
 
(a1) the simplicity and unity of physical monads is safeguarded by thinking of space 
along relationalist lines, as a bunch of external relations holding among their respective 
spheres of activity. 
(b1) the infinite divisibility of space is guaranteed if we think of those impenetrable 
spheres of activities as a ‘force field’, the field of a perfectly elastic repulsive force that 
fills the space, like Boerhaave’s fire, electric and magnetic fluids, or ultimately, like the 
ether qua the subtle matter of fire and light.  
 
Physical monads produce space via their external determinations, namely via their causal 
powers (attraction and repulsion). The continuity of space ensues from the continuity in 
the exercise of these causal powers (e.g. the continuous way in which the elastic force, as 
a subtle fluid, fills everything and acts by direct contact on other monads (with no vacua 
and no empty interstices). At the same time, just like a perfectly elastic subtle fluid that 
can be cut or sliced (so to speak) as one wishes, without destroying the simplicity or unity 
of the fluid itself, similarly Keill’s geometrical proof of the infinite divisibility of space 
could be reconciled with the unity and simplicity of the monads, without running the risk 
of cutting physical monads ‘at their joints’ and making spatial divisibility finite and 
discrete. 
The Newtonian “geometers” (i.e. Keill) were reconciled with the “metaphysicians” 
(i.e. Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten) by recasting a loose relationalism about space (qua 
appearance of the external relations of substances) in dynamical terms. Kant’s allegiance 
to speculative Newtonian experimentalism (from Newton’s optical ether to Boerhaave’s 
material fire)—evident in Kant’s remarks on inertia and specific densities of bodies—
made possible such a reconciliation. 
But surely, the perceptive reader would object, Kant’s view on space underwent a 
significant change in subsequent years. While in the 1758 New Doctrine of Motion and Rest, 
Kant was still defending a form of relationalism about space, broadly consonant with his 
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Wolffian treatment of impact50 against Newton’s absolute space, Kant appeared to have 
changed his mindset in the following decade. In the 1768 Concerning the ultimate ground of 
the differentiation of directions in space, Kant seemed to side unequivocally with Newton and 
the Newtonians in rejecting the opinions of the “German philosophers”, who claimed 
that space consisted solely in the external relations of the parts of matter. After all, twelve 
years after Physical Monadology, Kant clearly defended the view that directions in space 
could not be reduced to mutual relations among objects, but should be explained “in 
relation of the system of these positions to the absolute space of the universe”.51 Is not 
Kant here embracing Newton’s absolute space, with the famous argument for 
incongruent counterparts against Leibniz’s relationalism? Is not he supporting the 
“geometers” in proving that “Absolute space, independently of the existence of all 
matter and as itself the ultimate foundation of the possibility of the compound character 
of matter, has a reality of its own”?52  
There are three clues in Kant’s text, which in my view speak once again for a more 
nuanced debt to Newtonianism. For start, there is surprisingly no mention of Newton in 
the text. But this detail per se may not be very revealing. The question remains as to 
whether Kant was in fact defending Newton’s absolute space; or, was he instead holding 
on to Newton’s terminology, but devoid of its Newtonian connotations. I suggest that 
the latter option is more likely to be the case.  
First, the declared goal of the essay was to offer a proof intended for “geometers” 
of the claim that absolute space has a reality of its own. Kant lamented, by tacitly 
referring to the Leibniz–Clarke correspondence, that no metaphysical argument had been 
successful in establishing this claim. Nor were a posteriori proofs for absolute space 
available, Kant claimed, apart from Euler’s attempt to provide one for the prize essay of 
the Berlin Royal Academy of Sciences in 1748.53 But Kant discarded Euler’s as a proof 
intended for the engineers, not for “geometers”. Moreover, Euler’s proof was said to fail 
to engage with the difficulties arising when one tries to “represent [universal laws of 
motion] in concreto, employing the concept of absolute space”. 54  Did Kant ignore 
Newton’s own arguments for absolute space (i.e. the famous thought experiments 
concerning the bucket of water and the tied-globes)? Why does Kant say that there are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 For an interpretive analysis of this text, and its continuity with some of Kant’s mature 
views on rotation and relative motion, see Stan (forthcoming). 
51 AA 2: 377. Kant (1768/1992). 
52 AA 2: 378. Kant (1768/1992). 
53 See Stan (2012), p. 465. 
54 AA 2: 378. Kant (1768/1992). 
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serious difficulties if we try to represent laws of motion in concreto by employing the 
concept of absolute space? Was not Newton’s absolute space introduced precisely to 
ground the laws of motion and to provide a privileged reference frame to distinguish 
between inertial and non-inertial motions? Kant’s complaint against Euler’s proof (and 
perhaps Newton’s one too) could be explained if read against the backdrop of Euler’s 
distinction between the Metaphysicians, who denied that absolute space and time had 
any reality of their own, and the Mathematicians, who on the contrary considered space 
and place as real things. A charitable reading of Kant’s above claim would then be that 
Euler’s proof for absolute space cut no ice with the German metaphysicians because it 
presupposed precisely what the metaphysicians would question, namely the reality of 
absolute space. 
Thus, with an eye to providing a geometrical proof for absolute space that could 
speak for the ear of the German metaphysicians, Kant drew attention to three different 
considerations: 
 
(I) We can have empirical knowledge of things outside ourselves only 
insofar as these things entertain a particular relation to ourselves, and to 
our bodies. In Cartesian coordinates, if we take our body as the origin of 
the three axes, we can establish the distinction between above and below; 
left and right; in front of and behind. Similar reference to our body is 
inevitably presupposed in the indexical use of geographical maps and the 
compass.  
(II) Features found in some animal species (e.g., snails’ shells) and vegetable 
ones (e.g., the growth of beans and hops) reveal incongruent 
counterparts, despite the objects having same size, same proportion, and 
even same relative positions of their parts.  
(III) Incongruent counterparts seem to play a key role also in the “mechanical 
organization of the human body”, whereby Kant claimed that the 
majority of people are right-handed, while according to Borrelli and 
Bonnet, left eyes and left ears have more sensibility.  
 
These three different considerations pave the way to Kant’s conclusion that “the ground 
of the complete determination of a corporeal form does not depend simply on the 
relation and position of its parts to each other; it also depends on the reference of that 
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physical form to universal absolute space, as it is conceived by the geometers”.55 This is a 
curious conclusion and my second clue for a more nuanced reading of Kant’s debt to 
Newton. For it is unclear how points (I)–(III) may work as evidence for absolute space 
in Newton’s own sense (or, for that matter, absolute space as intended by the “geometers”). If 
anything, the considerations above may work as arguments against the “German 
philosophers” (i.e., Leibniz), who by appealing to relations among parts were unable to 
account for handedness and chirality. But it unclear how (I)–(III) could function as 
arguments for Newton’s absolute space itself. Point (I) simply shows the indexical and 
perspectival nature of spatial representation: it is an epistemic point about our ability to 
identify directions by locating ourselves onto the map. No distinctive metaphysical thesis 
about space follows from point (I). Points (II) and (III) can function as arguments 
against Leibniz, but not necessarily pro-Newton. For it is difficult to see how Newton’s 
absolute space could possibly enter into an explanation of the chirality of snail shells, 
hops, beans and the handedness of the human body in any salient way (unless a very 
weak reading of the claim is given, whereby the role of absolute space is simply reduced 
to a backdrop against which chirality and handedness become visible and salient, so to 
speak).56 That these incongruent counterparts exist as natural kinds does not begin to 
show that there must be absolute space to ground them. After all, also under the 
aforementioned weak reading, absolute space does not seem to be required for us to be 
able to identify incongruent counterparts. As point (I) makes clear, the perspectival 
nature of concepts such as left hand and right hand require only a relation to ourselves and 
our physical body (not to absolute space) for these concepts to be intelligible. Thus, it 
would be a non-sequitur to conclude from (I)–(III) that one must embrace Newton’s 
absolute space. If we understand the 1768 text as Kant’s pro-Newton text for absolute 
space, as the received view has done, we have to construe Kant’s three aforementioned 
considerations (I)–(III) as new proofs for absolute space (improving where Newton’s 
and Euler’s own proofs allegedly failed to persuade the “geometers”). But, as indicated 
above, at best these three considerations simply show that the geometers’ relationalism 
may face some difficulties in accounting for chirality and handedness. They do not 
provide compelling evidence for abandoning relationalism in favor of absolutism. In my 
view, Kant’s 1768 text never meant to endorse Newton’s absolute space, despite the term 
‘absolute space’ being used in it. Later readers have read Kant’s Directions in space as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 AA 2: 381. Kant (1768/1992). 
56 For a perceptive analysis of Kant’s argument, see Earman (1991). For a qualified 
contemporary defense of Kant’s argument, see Nerlich (1994), ch. 2.  
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short-lived defense of Newton’s absolutism before the Critical turn; but they face the 
problem of explaining exactly how Kant’s remarks above constitute evidence for such an 
interpretive claim. 
That these remarks do not provide evidence for this interpretive claim is 
corroborated by the fact that there is a third option in between relationalism and 
absolutism, and the denial of the former does not entail embracing the latter. This is the 
third and final clue in Kant’s text, which in my opinion betrays Kant’s qualified debt to 
Newton. Kant begins the essay by identifying absolute space with the “ultimate 
foundation of the possibility of the compound character of matter”. But this is not the 
way Newton typically thought of absolute space in the Principia. For Newton, absolute 
space provided the privileged reference frame to define absolute motion. It did not 
provide the foundation for the compositionality of matter: indeed, the whole problem 
about the compositionality of matter seems to belong more to metaphysics than to 
Newton’s physics. Hence, the above remark seems more in line with Kant’s Physical 
Monadology once again, and the way Kant came to see matter and space as intimately 
connected, although this time round Kant seemed to speculate that space ought to 
provide the foundation for the compositionality of matter, rather than the other way 
around (i.e., space being a consequence of matter filling space in virtue of physical 
monads as spheres of activity).  
The essay closes with the eloquent remark that “absolute space is not an object of 
outer sensation; it is rather a fundamental concept which first of all makes possible all 
such outer sensation”. 57  Kant referred to absolute space not as a real object, or 
substance, but as a Grundbegriff, which acted as a pre-condition of our sensible experience, 
anticipating his mature view of space as an a priori form of sensibility. The reality of 
space was also said to be “intuitive enough for inner sense”, while difficulties arise if we 
attempt to “philosophise about the ultimate data of our cognition”. Absolute space 
cannot be perceived as an outer object, nor be known as an object of experience. 
Instead, in remarkable continuity with the two-year later Inaugural Dissertation, space was 
presented as a concept, which makes possible our experience of nature.58 The road to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 AA 2: 383. Kant (1768/1992). 
58 In the Inaugural Dissertation, space is said to be again a “concept…not abstracted from 
outer sensation” but somehow presupposed in the possibility of outer perceptions (AA 
2: 402), and even a “pure intuition…as the fundamental form of all outer sensation” 
Kant (1770/1992).  
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Transcendental Aesthetic was still very long. But the groundbreaking path to it had been 
opened. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Newton’s legacy for Kant has been the object of sustained scholarly efforts over the past 
few decades. The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science have provided the battleground 
for alternative readings of Newton’s influence on Kant. While some scholars have read 
MAN as almost an instantiation of Kant’s Transcendental Analytic with the intent of 
justifying Newtonian mechanics, others have stressed the ‘looseness of fit’ between 
Kant’s special metaphysics of nature and the transcendental project of the first Critique.  
Over the past two decades, Friedman has put forward an alternative reading of 
Newton’s legacy for Kant, especially evident in MAN, whereby by rejecting Newton’s 
absolute space, the Critical Kant had to provide an alternative privileged reference frame 
for absolute motion in terms of the center of mass of the solar system. To this end, 
Friedman has defended the a priori necessity of Newton’s laws of motion and the 
synthetic a priori nature of Newton’s law of gravitation. More to the point, Friedman has 
interpreted Kant’s project in MAN as providing the conceptual justification for 
Newton’s mechanics in the absence of Newton’s fundamental toolkit (absolute space). 
An ongoing debate has revolved around Friedman’s very influential interpretation, and 
the peculiar nature of Kant’s laws of mechanics in MAN, among other aspects. 
The purpose of this brief chapter was to shift attention away from the Critical 
Kant, back to the pre-Critical Kant so as to appreciate the seminal seeds of his mature 
view. I hope I have achieved my two intended goals. First, to draw attention to the 
central role that Newton’s Opticks, with the ensuing experimental traditional that 
flourished in England with Stephen Hales and in Leiden with Herman Boerhaave played 
for the young Kant. Newton’s matter theory and chemical speculations shaped natural 
philosophy of the early eighteenth century, and had a profound influence in Kant’s 
development of his own matter theory. My second and related goal was to show that 
traces of speculative Newtonian experimentalism, suitably blended with a still quasi-
Wolffian-Baumgartian metaphysics, underpin the evolution of Kant’s view of space in 
between 1748–1768 (especially evident in Physical Monadology and in the treatment of 
repulsive force).  
Far from being an unfailing supporter of Newton’s absolute space before turning 
into a transcendental idealist, the pre-Critical Kant borrowed salient aspects of Wolff’s 
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and Baumgarten’s metaphysics, and integrated them with features of a broadly 
Newtonian matter theory. Space as an external determination of mutually acting physical 
substances (endowed with primitive attractive and repulsive forces) is a far cry from both 
Leibniz’s monadology and Newton’s absolute space. And even in his most representative 
Newtonian moment (i.e., Directions in space), a careful reading reveals gaps in Kant’s 
alleged arguments for a bona fide Newtonian absolute space. A lot of work remains to be 
done to explore the legacy of Newtonian experimentalism on Kant’s philosophy of 
nature. This brief introduction takes only some first, tentative steps into this still largely 
unexplored territory at the cross-junction of Kantian scholarship and Newtonian studies.  
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